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Abstract: 
Inflation-targeting central banks have only imperfect knowledge about the effect of policy 
decisions on inflation. An important source of uncertainty is the relationship between inflation 
and unemployment. This paper studies the optimal monetary policy in the presence of 
uncertainty about the natural unemployment rate, the short-run inflation-unemployment 
tradeoff and the degree of inflation persistence in a simple macroeconomic model, which 
incorporates rational learning by the central bank as well as private sector agents. Two 
conflicting motives drive the optimal policy. In the static version of the model, uncertainty 
provides a motive for the policymaker to move more cautiously than she would if she knew 
the true parameters. In the dynamic version, uncertainty also motivates an element of 
experimentation in policy. I find that the optimal policy that balances the cautionary and 
activist motives typically exhibits gradualism, that is, it still remains less aggressive than a 
policy that disregards parameter uncertainty. Exceptions occur when uncertainty is very high 
and in inflation close to target. 
 
 
JEL Classification:  E52, E24, D8, C61 
Keywords: monetary policy, inflation targeting, parameter uncertainty, optimal learning,  
natural unemployment rate. 1 Introduction
A number of central banks of industrialized countries have committed themselves to an
explicit inﬂation targeting strategy and such a strategy has also been recommended for
the European Central Bank and the U.S. Federal Reserve System. In implementing this
strategy central banks are faced with considerable uncertainty concerning the exact eﬀect of
their principal instrument, the short-term nominal interest rate, on inﬂation.1 A particularly
important and much discussed source of uncertainty regarding the transmission of monetary
policy to inﬂation is the relationship between unemployment and inﬂation. In implementing
policy, central banks have to rely on empirical estimates of the natural unemployment rate
(or NAIRU)2, the slope of the short-run inﬂation-unemployment tradeoﬀ and the degree
of inﬂation persistence. Estimates of these parameters have changed over time and their
precision is the subject of a continuing active debate.3 Indeed, Staiger, Stock and Watson
(1997a, 1997b, 2002) investigate a variety of empirical speciﬁcations for the United States
and ﬁnd that a typical 95% conﬁdence interval for the natural rate in 1990 was about
2.5 percentage points wide. The width of this conﬁdence interval is closely related to
the standard error of the slope of the short-run Phillips curve—most clearly in a linear
framework, where estimates of the natural rate are obtained from the ratio of intercept and
slope.
In general, a policy that would be optimal if the parameters of the inﬂation-
unemployment relationship were known with certainty will be recognized as suboptimal
once the uncertainty associated with these parameters is taken into account. In this paper,
I characterize the optimal policy in the presence of uncertainty about the natural unemploy-
ment rate, the short-run inﬂation-unemployment tradeoﬀ and the weight on forward-looking
1As a result, inﬂation-targeting central banks such as the Bank of England and the Sveriges Riksbank
have given the discussion of inﬂation uncertainty center stage in their inﬂation reports.
2An acronym for non-accelerating inﬂation rate of unemployment.
3For the recent empirical debate in the United States see Gordon (1997), Staiger, Stock, and Watson
(1997a), (1997b) and (2002), Blanchard and Katz (1997), Fuhrer (1995), Akerlof, Dickens and Perry (1996),
Phelps and Zoega (1997). There also exists a large literature on Phillips curves in other countries, see for
example Debelle and Laxton (1997) and others.
1expectations versus lagged inﬂation in the determination of current inﬂation. Two conﬂict-
ing motives drive the optimal policy. In the static version of the model, Phillips curve
uncertainty provides a motive for the policymaker to move more cautiously than she would
if she knew all the parameter values. In the dynamic version with learning by the central
bank and private agents, uncertainty also motivates an element of experimentation in policy.
Analysis of the motive for cautionary policy due to multiplicative parameter uncertainty
goes back to Brainard (1967) and has been used to justify a gradualist approach to monetary
policy. For example, Alan Blinder (1995, p.13), when he was vice-chairman of the Board of
Governors, argued that “a little stodginess at the central bank is entirely appropriate”, and
proposed in his Marshall lectures that “central banks should calculate the change in policy
required to get it right and then do less”.4 However, there are a number of reasons to believe
that such a Brainard-type analysis overstates the case for gradualism. For example, Caplin
and Leahy (1996) show that in a game between a policymaker who attempts to stimulate
the economy and potential investors, a cautious policy move may be ineﬀectual, because
investors anticipate lower interest rates in the future. Alternatively, proponents of robust
control in monetary policy5 have argued that worst-case outcomes may best be prevented
by following policy rules that are rather aggressive in responding to inﬂation deviations
from target. A further reason, investigated in this paper, is that a more aggressive policy
rule may generate more information, which would improve the precision of future estimates
and thereby future policy performance. Policymakers have noted this link between policy
and learning. For example, Stiglitz (1997), when Chairman of the Council of Economic
Advisers, recognized that “ a fuller discussion (of NAIRU uncertainty) would take into
account factors such as costs of adjustment and of variability in output and unemployment,
and dynamic learning eﬀects” and then asked the question: “are there policies that can
aﬀect the degree of uncertainty about the value of the NAIRU or of policy tradeoﬀs?”
The tradeoﬀ between current stabilization and exploration for the sake of better control
4See also Blinder (1998) for a discussion of this strategy.
5See for example Sargent (1999a), Hansen and Sargent (2001).
2in the future has been the focus of a theoretical as well as a computational literature on
optimal learning.6 Recent applications to monetary policy under uncertainty have been pro-
vided by Bertocci and Spagat (1993), Balvers and Cosimano (1994) and Wieland (2000b).
Among these, Wieland (2000b) studies the most general learning problem—a linear re-
gression with two unknown parameters—and numerically computes the optimal policy.7
Analytical results concerning optimal policy under parameter uncertainty are largely ab-
sent from the literature and numerical results are rare, because of the nonlinear nature of
the dynamic learning problem. Compared to the simple regression framework considered
in previous work, the problem studied in this paper is further complicated by the presence
of a lag as well as a forward-looking expectation of the dependent variable. The numerical
algorithm used in this paper is described in more detail in appendix A.
This paper makes the following contributions. First, extending Brainard’s analysis I
derive a cautionary policy rule in a model that incorporates rational forward-looking be-
havior by private sector agents in labor and ﬁnancial markets. I focus on the case of an
inﬂation-targeting central bank that commits to a speciﬁc interest rate rule in the face of
uncertainty about the NAIRU, the short-run slope of the Phillips curve and the weight on
inﬂation persistence in terms of lagged inﬂation versus forward-looking inﬂation expecta-
tions. This cautionary rule represents the optimal policy under commitment in the static
version of the model, where the central bank only cares about current performance and
disregards dynamic learning eﬀects. I ﬁnd that the cautionary rule implies gradualism, that
is, policy responds to inﬂationary or disinﬂationary shocks such that inﬂation gradually
returns to target and policy remains tight or expansive for several periods.
6One part of the literature focussed primarily on the asymptotic properties of beliefs and actions. (cf.
Taylor (1974), Anderson and Taylor (1976), Easley and Kiefer (1988), Kiefer and Nyarko (1989) and Aghion
et al. (1991)), while the other part focussed on characterizing optimal decision rules (cf. Prescott (1972),
Kendrick (1981), Kendrick (1982), Mizrach (1991), Amman and Kendrick (1995), Keller and Rady (1999),
Wieland (2000a)).
7Asymptotic properties of beliefs and policies in this framework have been studied by Easley and Kiefer
(1988) and Kiefer and Nyarko (1989), who have shown that incomplete learning may occur. Kasa (1999)
also discusses the possibility of incomplete learning by a central bank. Wieland (2000b) has evaluated the
speed of learning under alternative policies as well as the frequency with which a persistent bias in money
growth and inﬂation may arise due to such self-reinforcing incorrect beliefs subsequent a structural change
such as German uniﬁcation.
3Second, the paper presents numerical results concerning the optimal policy in a dynamic
model with rational learning8 by the central bank as well as forward-looking agents in labor
and ﬁnancial markets. I ﬁnd that the optimal policy incorporates a quantitatively signiﬁcant
degree of experimentation as indicated by a more aggressive policy response than under the
cautionary Brainard-type policy. However, the optimal policy typically remains less aggres-
sive than a certainty-equivalent policy that completely disregards parameter uncertainty.
Thus, in most cases the recommendation for gradualist policymaking under parameter un-
certainty survives in the dynamic model with learning. Only, when uncertainty is very high
and inﬂation close to target, does the optimal policy imply a more aggressive response than
a policy that disregards parameter uncertainty. I proceed to quantify the optimal degree
of gradualism and experimentation using empirical estimates of Phillips curve parameter
uncertainty by Fuhrer (1995) and Staiger, Stock and Watson (2002). In analyzing the
optimal extent of experimentation I also investigate in detail how it is inﬂuenced by the
presence of forward-looking rational inﬂation expectations in the Phillips curve and and
ﬁnancial markets (i.e. the money market relevant for the deﬁnition of the short-term real
interest rate). The qualitative properties of the optimal policy are the same under rational
learning by private agents as under adaptive expectations. However, the optimal extent of
experimentation is smaller, because forward-looking behavior by private agents introduces
an expectations channel of monetary policy transmission.
Third, the policy rules derived in this paper are directly comparable to Taylor-style
interest rate rules that have been studied extensively in the recent literature on monetary
policy.9 This literature has focused on evaluating the performance of monetary policy
rules in diﬀerent macroeconometric models under the assumption that all parameters are
known with certainty. The analysis in this paper shows how the response coeﬃcients of
such a policy rule need to be adjusted in the presence of uncertainty about the relationship
between unemployment and inﬂation.
8Boundedly rational learning by central banks is studied by Sims (1988) and Sargent (1999b).
9See for example Taylor (1993, 1999), Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), McCallum (1999), Clarida, Gali
and Gertler (1998, 1999), Levin, Wieland and Williams (1999, 2002) and many others.
4The next section introduces the macroeconomic model that forms the basis of the sub-
sequent analysis of optimal policy rules under uncertainty. In section 3 the cautionary
Brainard-type policy rule is derived analytically. Section 4 presents the dynamic frame-
work with learning. A quantitative comparison of the optimal, cautionary and certainty-
equivalent policy rules is provided in section 5. Section 6 relates these ﬁndings to empirically
documented Phillips curve uncertainty. Section 7 concludes and discusses several extensions
and avenues for future research.
2 The model
To begin, I consider a central bank that pursues a strict inﬂation-targeting strategy as
deﬁned by Svensson (1997a). Such a central bank conducts monetary policy so as to min-
imize expected squared deviations from its inﬂation target π∗.10 This loss function can be
decomposed in two terms indicating the possibility of a tradeoﬀ between the conditional
expectation of inﬂation deviations from target and the conditional variance of inﬂation:
L(πt)=Et−1
 
(πt − π∗)2
 
=( Et−1 [πt − π∗])
2 + VA R t−1 [πt]( 1 )
In the following, I characterize optimal monetary policy under uncertainty for this cen-
tral bank within a simple model of the macroeconomy that follows Clark, Goodhart and
Huang (1999). The centerpiece of this model is a Phillips curve that explicitly introduces
inﬂation persistence, in the form of lagged inﬂation, together with forward-looking inﬂation
expectations:
πt = γπt−1 +( 1− γ)πe
t + β(ut − u∗
t)+ t where β<0,0 <γ≤ 1( 2 )
Current inﬂation πt is related to the deviation of the unemployment rate ut from the nat-
ural rate with a negative slope parameter β. Furthermore, it depends on lagged inﬂation
πt−1, price-setters’ expectation of inﬂation πe
t, and a normally-distributed random shock
 t ∼ N(0,σ2
 ). This speciﬁcation is sometimes called the ‘backward and forward-looking
10An extension to ﬂexible inﬂation targeting, which incorporates an output or unemployment stabilization
objective, will be discussed in the ﬁnal section of the paper.
5components’ model of the Phillips curve (cf. Buiter and Miller (1985)). The backward-
looking component reﬂects inertia in inﬂation that may be derived from some types of
overlapping wage contracts11 or may be attributed to the presence of rule-of-thumb price
setters. The coeﬃcients of the two components sum to unity so that in the long-run equi-
librium, πt = πt−1 = πe
t.A sγ approaches zero, this speciﬁcation simpliﬁes to the standard
Lucas surprise supply function. For γ = 1 it corresponds to the traditional accelerationist
Phillips curve.12 The long-run equilibrium rate of unemployment, i.e. the natural rate, is
denoted by u∗
t. An often used assumption regarding the evolution of u∗
t is:
u∗
t = u∗
t−1 + ηt (3)
where ηt ∼ N(0,σ2
η). For σ2
η > 0, the natural rate follows a random walk. For σ2
η = 0, the
natural rate is constant, u∗
t = u∗
0 ∀ t.
Two more equations are needed to account for the transmission of monetary policy from
the central bank’s principal policy instrument, that is, the short-term nominal interest rate,
it, to the policy target, i.e. the inﬂation rate. First, the unemployment rate is related to real
aggregate demand, yt according to a version of “Okun’s Law.”13 Then, aggregate demand
is related to the short-term real interest rate, that is the diﬀerence between the nominal
rate it and expected inﬂation:
ut = φyt where λ<0( 4 )
yt = λ(it − πe
t) where φ<0( 5 )
It remains to specify private sector expectations of inﬂation, πe
t. The benchmark for the
following analysis will be the case of rational expectations. For comparison I will also
11See for example Fuhrer and Moore (1995a,b).
12Typical empirical estimates of this speciﬁcation indicate a signiﬁcant degree of inﬂation persistence
ranging from 0.5 to near unity (cf. Fuhrer (1997) and Roberts (1997)). The New-Keynesian Phillips curve,
that has received much interest in the recent literature (cf. Gali and Gertler (1999)), diﬀers from the above
speciﬁcation only in the timing of the forward-looking inﬂation term which concerns period t +1 . T h e
preferred empirical speciﬁcation of the New-Keynesian Phillips curve also embodies a signiﬁcant degree of
inﬂation persistence.
13For a textbook discussion of this empirical regularity see Dornbusch and Fischer (1990). Clark et al.
(1999) do not need this relationship, because they specify the Phillips curve in terms of the output gap
rather than the unemployment gap.
6consider the case of adaptive, random-walk expectations, i.e. πe
t = πt−1. In that case
the Phillips curve speciﬁcation (2) simpliﬁes again to the traditional accelerationist Phillips
curve and the ex-post real interest rate appears in the aggregate demand relationship. Under
forward-looking behavior, expected inﬂation will be a function of the state of the economy,
the parameters and importantly also the policy rule pursued by the central bank:
πe
t =( γ + βλφ)−1(γπt−1 − βu∗
t−1 + βλφ ie
t )( 6 )
Here the private sector’s expectation regarding monetary policy is denoted by ie
t. It indicates
that we need to distinguish between discretionary policy and a possible commitment by the
central bank to a speciﬁc policy rule. Under discretion, the central bank optimizes policy
taking private sector expectations as given and unaﬀected by its choice of interest rate.
Under commitment, the central bank internalizes the impact of its decision rule on private
sector expectations and commits to delivering the state-contingent interest rate setting that
is expected under this rule. The recent literature on monetary policy rules14 has emphasized
the beneﬁts of adhering to a rule rather than pursuing discretionary policy. Thus, in the
following analysis I will focus on the optimal policy under commitment and only return to
the case of discretion in the last section of the paper.
The central bank will set the nominal interest rate it so as to minimize L(.) based on its
knowledge of the state of the economy (i.e. lagged inﬂation), the parameters (i.e. β,γ and
the natural rate) but before the shocks  t and ηt are realized. It can predict and respond
to impending changes in inﬂation only to the extent that they result from endogenous
inﬂation persistence but not to the current-period random shocks. When the central bank
is committed to a state-contingent rule such as
it = H(πt−1,β,γ,u ∗
t−1,λ,φ), (7)
it will implicitly take into account how its actions aﬀect private sector expectations. Clarke
et al. (1999) show that the optimal policy under commitment to such a rule can be obtained
14See for example the contributions in Taylor (1999).
7by minimizing the loss function L(.) with respect to it and ie
t under the explicit restriction
that the ex-ante expected nominal interest rate, ie
t, is equal to its rational expectation:15
ie
t = Et−1[it |πt−1,β,γ,u ∗
t−1,φ,λ]( 8 )
From (7) and (8) and the assumption made earlier that neither the central bank nor the
private sector have prior information on the random shocks ( t,η t) when choosing it and ie
t
respectively, it follows that the private sector’s ex-ante rational expectation of the nominal
interest rate will be equal to the interest rate prescribed by the state-contingent policy rule,
Et−1[it |πt−1,β,γ,u ∗
t−1,λ,φ]=H(πt−1,β,γ,u ∗
t−1,λ,φ). As a result, the private sector’s
rational expectation of inﬂation is
πe
t = Et−1[πt]=( γ + βλφ)−1(γπt−1 − βu∗
t−1 + βλφ H(πt−1,β,γ,u ∗
t−1,λ,φ)) (9)
Furthermore, due to symmetric information between central bank and private sector, the
expectation derived in (9) also corresponds to the central bank’s rational expectation of
inﬂation that enters the loss function (1).16 The second element of the loss function is the
conditional variance of inﬂation,
VA R t−1[πt]=σ2
  + β2σ2
η (10)
which turns out not to depend on the interest rate rule. Thus, the central bank will be
able to minimize its loss L(.) simply by setting the interest rate to the value that induces
an expected inﬂation rate equal to the inﬂation target Et−1[πt]=π∗. This corresponds to
a strategy of “inﬂation forecast targeting” as deﬁned by Svensson (1997a). As a result, the
expected deviation from target will be equal to zero and the minimized loss will correspond
to the exogenous conditional variance (10). The implied optimal interest rate rule is:
it = H(πt−1,β,γ,u ∗
t−1,λ,φ)=( λφ)−1u∗
t−1 − (βλφ))−1(γπt−1 − (γ + βλφ)π∗) (11)
15Note that in this notation, the private sector’s expectations of inﬂation and the nominal interest rate,
π
e
t and i
e
t are variables, while Et−1πt and Et−1it, the rational expectations at t − 1 are functions of the
policy rule, lagged inﬂation and the parameters. Committing to Et−1[it] has also been used as commitment
strategy by Svensson (1997b) and many others.
16Possible extensions allowing for asymmetric information are discussed in the ﬁnal section of the paper.
8The ﬁrst term of this rule essentially represents the equilibrium real interest rate, which is
related to the natural unemployment rate. The second term represents the central bank’s
response to past inﬂation that is intended to return inﬂation to its target value in the next
period. Note that the parameters β,λ and φ are all negative and the central bank responds
to an increase in inﬂation by raising the nominal interest rate in the following period. The
magnitude of the necessary policy response depends on the degree of inﬂation persistence
and the slope of the Phillips curve as well as the slope parameter of Okun’s law and the
aggregate demand equation. As can be seen from (11) the neutral setting of the nominal
interest rate when inﬂation is on target is: it =( λφ)−1u∗
t−1 + π∗.
To clarify the eﬀect of rational expectations in this model I also derive the optimal policy
rule under adaptive random-walk expectations (i.e. πe
t = πt−1):
it =( λφ)−1u∗
t−1 + πt−1 − (βλφ))−1(πt−1 − π∗) (12)
A comparison of the partial derivatives of (11) and (12) with respect to lagged inﬂation
shows that the central bank needs to respond to an increase in inﬂation by raising the
nominal interest rate in the subsequent period to a much greater extent if the private sector
forms adaptive rather than rational expectations, (βφλ − 1)(βφλ)−1 > −γ(βφλ)−1 > 0.
The reason is that under rational expectations the private sector expects the central bank
to raise interest rates suﬃciently to return inﬂation to target in the next period and forms
its inﬂation forecast accordingly. Under commitment, the central bank in turn takes into
account this beneﬁcial eﬀect of private sector expectations in the formulation of its monetary
policy rule. In the literature this eﬀect is typically referred to as the ’expectations channel’
of monetary policy transmission.
So far we have focussed on the static problem under certainty, where the central bank
minimizes current period losses with perfect knowledge regarding the parameters of the
model.17 In the next section, we introduce uncertainty with respect to the parameters of
the Phillips curve.
17Under strict inﬂation targeting with known parameters the optimal rule in the static model is in fact
also dynamically optimal.
93 Parameter uncertainty and cautionary policy
The policy rule (11) cannot be implemented if the parameters of the Phillips curve, that is,
the natural unemployment rate u∗
t, the slope β and the index of persistence γ are unknown.
However the policymaker can obtain recursive estimates from the following equation:
πt − Et−1πt = αt + βut + γ(πt−1 − Et−1πt)+ t (13)
The intercept of this equation corresponds to the product of the unknown slope and the
natural rate and may therefore vary over time according to:
αt = βu∗
t = βu∗
t−1 + βηt = αt−1 + νt where νt ∼ N(0,σ2
ν) (14)
The means of the intercept, slope and persistence parameters as of t − 1 are denoted by
Et−1[(αt,β,γ) ]=( at−1,b t−1,c t−1), (15)
while the degree of uncertainty about these parameters based on t − 1 information is char-
acterized by the following covariance matrix:
Σt|t−1 =



va
t|t−1 vab
t−1 vac
t−1
vab
t−1 vb
t−1 vbc
t−1
vac
t−1 vbc
t−1 vc
t−1


 =



va
t−1 + σ2
ν vab
t−1 vac
t−1
vab
t−1 vb
t−1 vbc
t−1
vac
t−1 vbc
t−1 vc
t−1


 (16)
The twelve variables (at−1,b t−1,Σt|t−1) deﬁne a trivariate normal distribution which com-
prises all relevant information about the unknown parameters (αt,β,γ) at time t-1. This dis-
tribution represents the policymaker’s beliefs about the parameters of the Phillips curve.18
The NAIRU is not an explicit element of this distribution, but as in the empirical literature
on Phillips curves the ratio of the means can be used as an estimator for the NAIRU:
ˆ u∗
t = at−1b−1
t−1 (17)
18Note that for mathematical convenience, the variances of the normally distributed shocks σ
2
ν,σ
2
  are
assumed to be known. This is a standard assumption in the optimal learning literature (see Easley and
Kiefer (1988), Kiefer and Nyarko (1989)). It guarantees that given a normal prior, the posterior belief
will also be a normal distribution. The normality assumption regarding the parameter estimates does not
take into account the restrictions on the sign or the magnitude of the parameters, s.t. the non-negativity
of the natural unemployment rate or the constraint of the persistence index to (0,1]. We maintain this
assumption throughout this section for tractability of the theoretical analysis. The numerical analysis later
on will recognize the explicit constraint on the index parameter γ in assessing the impact of policy on future
estimates.
10This illustrates that the uncertainty about NAIRU estimates that is emphasized in the
empirical literature on Phillips curves cannot be discussed separately from the uncertainty
that is associated with slope of the short-run inﬂation-unemployment tradeoﬀ.
Given our starting assumption of symmetric information between central bank and pri-
vate sector this distribution also represents the private sector beliefs about the unknown
parameters. Furthermore, for the remainder of this analysis we will continue to treat the
other parameters, (λ,φ), as known. Then, the central bank’s and private sector’s expec-
tation of inﬂation as of t − 1 that appeared in equation (13) above can be expressed as a
function of lagged inﬂation and last period’s beliefs as well as the central bank’s policy rule
H(πt−1,a t−1,b t−1,c t−1,Σt|t−1,λ,φ) conditional on those same beliefs.
Et−1πt =( ct−1 + bt−1λφ)−1(at−1 + bt−1λφH(.)+ct−1πt−1) (18)
This brings us back to the central question of the paper, namely what is an appropriate
implementable policy rule H(.) under parameter uncertainty. A ﬁrst potential candidate is
the optimal rule under certainty in (11), which can be rendered implementable by replacing
actual parameter values with available estimates:
it = Hceq(.)=( λφ)−1at−1b−1
t−1 − (bt−1λφ))−1(ct−1πt−1 − (ct−1 + bt−1λφ)π∗) (19)
This “certainty-equivalent” policy rule is useful as a benchmark for comparison but it is
clearly not optimal in the presence of parameter uncertainty. The one-period optimal policy
rule can be derived analytically by minimizing the current expected loss, L(.), conditional
on all available information, including the degree of uncertainty associated with the param-
eter estimates. As noted previously, the loss L(.) consists of two components. The ﬁrst
component, the square of the expected deviation of inﬂation from target, uses the inﬂation
expectation deﬁned by (18). The second component is the conditional variance of inﬂation:
VA R t−1[πt]= σ2
  + va
t|t−1 + u2
tvb
t−1 +( πt−1 − Et−1πt)2vc
t−1 (20)
+2utvab
t−1 +2 vac
t−1(πt−1 − Et−1πt)+2 vbc
t−1ut(πt−1 − Et−1πt))
where ut = φλ(H(.) − Et−1πt)a n dEt−1πt deﬁned as in (18)
11This variance depends on the degree of parameter uncertainty and on the chosen policy
rule. As a consequence, the central bank faces a trade-oﬀ between the expected deviation of
inﬂation from target and the conditional variance of inﬂation. Thus, the optimal rule does
not simply imply inﬂation-forecast targeting but importantly takes into account inﬂation
uncertainty. Since its response to uncertainty reﬂects caution as a motive in monetary
policymaking, I will refer to it as the ’cautionary’ rule. It takes the form:
it = Hcau(.)=−((bt−1λφ)2 + R1))−1 (( ct−1bt−1λφ − R1)πt−1 (21)
−(ct−1 + bt−1λφ)bt−1λφπ∗ + at−1(bt−1λφ + R2)+R3 )
where the eﬀect of the parameter variances and covariances is summarized by (R1,R 2,R 3):
R1 = vb
t−1c2
t−1 + vc
t−1(bt−1λφ)2 − 2vbc
t−1(ct−1bt−1λφ)
R2 =( vc
t−1 + vbc
t−1)(bt−1λφ) − (vb
t−1 + vbc
t−1)ct−1 (22)
R3 = vab
t−1ct−1(ct−1 + bt−1λφ) − vac
t−1bt−1λφ(ct−1 + bt−1λφ)
Each of these three coeﬃcients would be zero in the absence of uncertainty and the pol-
icy rule would simplify to (19). Under uncertainty, however, optimal policy depends on
the parameter variances (vb,vc) and covariances (vab,vac,vbc). It does not depend on the
variance of the intercept in the estimated equation, va, the reason being that for a lin-
ear model and quadratic objective function certainty-equivalence applies with respect to
additive uncertainty.
In his seminal paper Brainard showed that multiplicative parameter uncertainty such
as the uncertainty captured by vb provides a motive for cautious, gradualist policymak-
ing.19 A comparison between the rules (21) and (19) shows that this result extends to the
model with rational expectations and inﬂation persistence considered in this paper. Here,
gradualism arises in two ways. First, the response of the cautionary rule (21) subsequent
to an increase in inﬂation is more muted than under the certainty-equivalent rule (19).
19Other papers that have looked at this eﬀect recently are Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999), Estrella and
Mishkin (1998) and Svensson (1999). Sack (1999) shows how parameter uncertainty can explain the high
degree of serial correlation in interest rates.
12The partial derivative δHcau/δπt−1 is a function of the variance of the slope estimate, vb,
the variance of the index of persistence, vc and their covariance, vbc. Once one recognizes
that the parameter R1 in (22) is equivalent to the variance, VA R (βct−1 − γbt−1λφ), and
consequently must be non-negative, it is straightforward to show that:
δHcau
δπt−1
=
ct−1bt−1λφ − R1
(bt−1λφ)2 + R1
<δ H ceqδπt−1 =
ct−1
bt−1λφ
(23)
Thus, under parameter uncertainty the central bank will increase the nominal interest rate
subsequent an inﬂationary shock by less than in the absence of uncertainty. This increase in
the interest rate will not be suﬃcient to return next period inﬂation to target in expectation.
Thus, under parameter uncertainty even a strict inﬂation- targeting central bank will not
pursue a pure inﬂation-forecast targeting strategy deﬁned as keeping expected inﬂation
always on target. Instead, inﬂation will remain elevated and only return to target gradually
over the next few periods. Similarly, the interest rate will exhibit gradualism in that it will
be expected to remain elevated and only return to its neutral level after some time.
The cautionary policy rule (21) also exhibits a second element of caution or gradualism.
This becomes apparent when we consider its implications in a situation where last period’s
inﬂation rate is equal to the central bank’s target, πt−1 = π∗. It may seem surprising at
ﬁrst that the cautionary rule does not prescribe the same neutral setting as the certainty-
equivalent rule in this case. The certainty-equivalent rule would set the nominal interest
rate equal to its estimated neutral rate, (λφ)−1at−1b−1
t−1 + π∗. Why does the cautionary
rule not adopt the same neutral setting when πt−1 = π∗? The reason again is related to
the second component of the central bank’s loss function, that is the conditional variance
of inﬂation, i.e. inﬂation uncertainty. The setting of the interest rate that minimizes the
conditional variance of inﬂation need not be equivalent to its estimated neutral level. Rather
the cautionary rule sets the nominal interest rate according to a simple weighted average of
its neutral level and the variance-minimizing level:
Hcau(πt−1 = π∗)=
(bt−1λφ)2
(bt−1λφ)2 + R1
 
π∗ −
1
λφ
at−1
bt−1
 
(24)
13+
R1
(bt−1λφ)2 + R1
 
π∗ −
at−1R2 + R3
R1
 
Here the ﬁrst term in large parentheses corresponds to the neutral or natural level of the
nominal interest rate, which ensures that unemployment is equal to the NAIRU, while the
second term corresponds to the variance-minimizing level of the nominal interest rate, given
πt−1 = π∗.
By deﬁnition the variance-minimizing level of the nominal interest rate is that level
where the central bank will be able to assess the impact of the nominal interest rate on
unemployment and inﬂation with the highest possible precision. Thus, the tendency to set
the nominal interest rate near that level whenever inﬂation is on target clearly reﬂects a
cautionary motive. Again, this motive implies a gradualist pursuit of policy. This becomes
particularly clear when considering the case of constant natural unemployment rate u∗
t =
u∗
0, i.e. a constant intercept, α, in the estimated inﬂation equation (13) discussed at the
beginning of this section. In this case, the parameters (α,β,γ) may be estimated by recursive
least squares. By deﬁnition, least squares estimates imply that the variance of the dependent
variable is minimized at the means of the explanatory variables. Since the explanatory
variables in (13), ut and πt−1−Et−1πt, are both linear functions of the ex-post real interest
rate it−πt−1, their historical mean values will coincide with the average ex-post real interest
rate. Thus, when the optimal rule leans towards the variance-minimizing level of the interest
rate it eﬀectively keeps the ex-post real interest rate closer to its past average. As a result,
the policy stance changes more gradually over time as would be prescribed by a policy rule
that disregards inﬂation uncertainty arising from imprecise parameter estimates.
Clearly, the cautionary policy rule (21) that minimizes expected one-period loss is not
necessarily optimal in a dynamic context. It is a “myopic” policy, because it disregards
the eﬀect of the current interest rate setting on future parameter estimates and policy
performance. In the next section, I show how the estimates of the parameters of the
inﬂation equation (13) may be updated over time and how such learning introduces an
important dynamic link between current policy decisions and future parameter uncertainty
14and stabilization performance.
4 Rational learning and the optimal policy rule
As new observations on inﬂation and unemployment become available the central bank and
private sector agents can update their estimates of the unknown parameters (α,β,γ) in the
inﬂation equation (13). As long as they share the same information and start oﬀ with the
same prior belief about the unknown parameters their estimates and updating equations
will coincide. The relevant updating equations for their beliefs (at−1,b t−1,c t−1,Σt|t−1)c a n
be cast in form of the Kalman ﬁlter. To be able to present the updating equations in a
compact manner it is helpful to deﬁne a vector of beliefs θt = (at bt ct)  as well as a
vector of explanatory variables Xt = (1 ut (πt−1 − Et−1πt))  where Et−1πt is as deﬁned
in equation (18). Then the updating equations can be expressed as:
θt = θt−1 +Σ t|t−1XtF−1(πt − Et−1πt − at−1 − bt−1ut − ct−1(πt−1 − Et−1πt))
Σt|t =Σ t|t−1 − Σt|t−1XtF−1X 
tΣt|t−1 (25)
where F = XtΣt|t−1X 
t + σ2
 
Under the assumption that the error terms are normally distributed with known variances
σ2
  and σ2
ν, (25) is equivalent to Bayesian updating20 of the trivariate normal distribution
that represents the central bank’s and private sector’s beliefs about αt,β and γ.21 Under
the assumption of a constant natural unemployment rate, these updating equations are also
equivalent to recursive least squares. In that case the intercept parameter α will be constant
and the only change in the updating equations will be that va
t|t−1 = va
t−1.
As a result of rational learning by the central bank and the private sector the current
choice of the interest rate will aﬀect the precision of the point estimates as well as the
20The asymptotic behavior of these beliefs is discussed further in appendix B.
21This dynamic learning model extends earlier analysis of optimal learning by Wieland (2000a) and (2000b)
in a simple regression framework. It allows for a lagged dependent variable with an additional unknown
parameter and includes the rational expectation of the dependent variable. These extensions raise the number
of state variables and increase computational complexity, but their beneﬁt is to allow application of the
optimal learning framework to a simple but completely speciﬁed model of the monetary policy transmission
mechanism.
15estimates themselves through its impact on current unemployment, inﬂation expectations
and inﬂation. By choosing the interest rate appropriately, the policymaker can raise the
precision of parameter estimates and improve future performance, albeit at the expense of
higher current variability of inﬂation. Thus, the optimal policy rule H(πt−1,θ t−1,π∗,λ,φ)
in this dynamic model with learning solves the following optimization problem:
Min
H(.)
E
  ∞  
t=0
δt(πt − π∗)2 | (π0,θ 0)
 
(26)
s.t. it = H(πt−1,θ t−1,π∗,λ,φ)f o rt =1 ,∞
and s.t. equations (4) ,(5) ,(13) ,(18) and (25)
This is a dynamic discrete-time stochastic control problem, which can be rewritten as a
dynamic program. A nonstandard feature of this dynamic problem is that decisions aﬀect
the expectations operator itself. However, one can still use a standard contraction mapping
argument as in Kiefer and Nyarko (1989) to show that a unique value function exists, which
solves the dynamic program and corresponds to the inﬁmum of the sum of expected current
and discounted future losses in (26). The state variables of this dynamic programming
problem are lagged inﬂation πt−1 and last period’s beliefs θt−1. Denoting the value function
for this dynamic program by V (π,θ) the associated Bellman equation corresponds to:
V (πt−1,θ t−1)=
Min
H(.)
L(πt−1,θ t−1,H(.))
+ δ
 
V (πt( H(.) ,..) ,θ t( H(.),..))f( πt| πt−1,θ t−1,H(.))dπ
(27)
=
Min
H(.)
L(πt−1,θ t−1,H(.)) + δ
 
V (αt,β,γ,  t,H (.) ,π t−1,θ t−1)
p(αt,β,γ| πt−1,θ t−1,H(.))q( ) dα dβ dγ d 
Two terms on the right-hand side of the upper equation in (27) characterize the tradeoﬀ
between current control and estimation. L(.) is the expected current loss, while the second
term denotes the expectation of next period’s value function, which summarizes all future
16losses and is multiplied with the discount factor δ. This second term incorporates the
value of information. Note that θt, the vector of beliefs at time t, is stochastic and can
only be calculated once time t unemployment and inﬂation observations become available.
f(πt|.) is the corresponding predictive distribution of inﬂation. Inﬂation, unemployment
and next period’s beliefs all depend on the central bank’s choice of interest rate it and thus
on its policy rule H(πt−1,θ t−1,π∗,λ,φ,σ  ,σ η) that feeds back on all currently available
information.
In the lower equation in (27), time t values of inﬂation and beliefs have been substi-
tuted out using equations (4), (5), (13), (18) and (25). They are functions of the previous
period’s inﬂation rate and beliefs, and also of the unknown parameters and random shock
 t. Expectations are taken with respect to the unknown parameters and the random shock.
p(αt,β,γ|.) is the trivariate normal distribution that describes the policymaker’s beliefs
about αt, β and γ. q( ) refers to the normal density function of the shocks in the Phillips
curve.
Associated with this Bellman equation is a stationary optimal policy function which
maps the state variables (πt−1,θ t−1) into a value for the nominal interest rate:
it = Hopt(πt−1,θ t−1,π∗,γ,φ,δ,σ  ,σ η) (28)
It is the dynamically optimal counterpart of the certainty-equivalent and cautionary policy
rules (19) and (21) that were derived analytically in the preceding section. Unfortunately
analytical solutions for Hopt(.) are not available due to the nonlinear nature of the dy-
namic decision problem. However, one can use numerical dynamic programming methods
to approximate the value function and the optimal policy rule.
5 The optimal balance of caution and experimentation
The Bellman equation (27) deﬁnes a contraction mapping with a unique ﬁxed point, which
is the value function. Starting from an initial guess of the value function, one can obtain
successively better approximations by repeatedly solving the optimization problem on the
17right-hand side of (27). As is well known, this iterative method can be implemented numer-
ically. However, its application is hampered by the “curse of dimensionality” which implies
that the number of necessary computations increases geometrically with the number of state
variables. The numerical algorithm used here combines such value function iterations with
policy iterations to speed up convergence. Nevertheless, the optimal learning problem with
three unknown parameters in (26), which has a total of 10 continuous state variables is too
large to be solved numerically with reasonable precision.22 Instead I provide numerical re-
sults for three simpler versions of this learning problem. First, I discuss a learning problem
with one unknown parameter, the slope of the Phillips curve, β. Then, I report results on
two generalizations of this problem, each with learning about two unknown parameters. In
one case the central bank and private sector agents are learning about the intercept and
slope of the Phillips curve (α,β) and in the other case about the slope and the index of
persistence (β,γ). In presenting these results I will discuss the diﬀerences in the optimal
policy under adaptive expectations versus rational learning of private sector agents in labor
markets and ﬁnancial markets in detail. Inﬂation expectations relevant to labor market
decisions appear in the Phillips curve with their importance depending on γ, while inﬂation
expectations concerning ﬁnancial market decisions appear in the deﬁnition of the ex-ante
real interest rate.
Table 1: Calibration
Economy φ = −1 λ = −1
Central Bank π∗ =0 δ =0 .95
Noise σ2
  =1 σ2
η =0
To conduct numerical analysis of the optimal learning problem it is necessary to specify
numerical values for several parameters. The chosen values are reported in Table 1.
22The numerical algorithm and associated computation costs are discussed in more detail in appendix A.
18Policy with uncertain β
First, I consider optimal learning by the central bank when private sector agents form
adaptive expectations, i.e. πe
t = πt−1. Figure 1 compares the response to lagged inﬂation
implied by the dynamically optimal policy rule with that of the cautionary and certainty-
equivalent rules. The ﬁgure contains nine panels. In each panel the horizontal axis measures
the deviation of lagged inﬂation πt−1 from the zero inﬂation target. The vertical axis
corresponds to the expected deviation of unemployment from its natural rate that would
occur given the nominal interest rate set by the central bank in response to the inﬂation
deviation from target. Given the parameter settings (λ = −1,φ = −1), the vertical axis
is also equal to the expected deviation of the real interest rate it − πe
t from its equilibrium
value, (φλ)−1u∗. Each panel compares the optimal policy rule (solid line with thick dots)23
to the certainty-equivalent rule (dashed line) and the cautionary rule (dashed-dotted line)
for a given combination of the slope estimate b and its variance vb. The ﬁrst row of panels
corresponds to an estimate of b = −0.2, the second row to b = −0.3 and the third row to b−
0.5. The columns are ordered as follows: the ﬁrst column corresponds to a variance of vb =
0.04 the second column to vb =0 .09 and the third column to vb =0 .25. Thus, the lower-
left panels show the policy response to inﬂation when the parameter β is estimated rather
precisely, while the upper-right panels consider policy responses under high to extreme
uncertainty.
The following ﬁve ﬁndings are directly apparent from Figure 1. First, not surprisingly
the certainty-equivalent and cautionary policy rules respond linearly to inﬂation for a given
degree of uncertainty, while the optimal rule responds in a nonlinear fashion. Second, the
optimal rule always requires a more aggressive policy response to inﬂation than the caution-
ary rule. In absolut terms this diﬀerence, which represents the extent of experimentation
incorporated in the optimal rule, changes little for moderate to high inﬂation deviations
from target.24 Third, the optimal rule typically implies a less aggressive policy stance than
23The thick dots correspond to the grid points used in the numerical approximation.
24In other words, the relative importance of experimentation declines with the size of the inﬂation deviation
from target. If inﬂation is substantially above target even the cautionary policy will result in a substantial
19Figure 1: Optimal vs Cautionary and Certainty Equivalent Policy Rules
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the certainty-equivalent rule that disregards parameter uncertainty. Thus, in spite of the
incentive to experiment, the optimal policy exhibits gradualism. The policy tightening (or
easing) following a shock to inﬂation is expected to persist for more than one period and
implies a gradual return of inﬂation towards the target. Fourth, when lagged inﬂation is
near the target (typically within less than 1 percentage point), the optimal policy response
is somewhat more aggressive than the certainty-equivalent rule. Fifth, when uncertainty is
policy response that will be expected to generate quite a bit of information about the inﬂation-unemployment
tradeoﬀ and the location of the natural rate.
20extremely high (i.e. t-statistic < 1), the optimal policy rule exhibits a clear discontinuity at
zero inﬂation. In other words, the optimal policy response at zero inﬂation diﬀers from the
neutral setting that would ensure an expected inﬂation rate equal to zero. It implies that
the central bank accepts higher or lower expected inﬂation in order to obtain more precise
parameter estimates and improve inﬂation stabilization in the future.
Figure 2: Optimal vs Cautionary and Certainty Equivalent Policy Rules
Rational learning in labor markets (γ =0 .8)
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Next, we allow for rational learning by private sector agents in the labor market. Given
symmetric information and policy commitment to a rule, rational forward-looking agents
21form the same beliefs about the unknown parameter β as the central bank. The index of
persistence γ is set to 0.8 implying a weight of 0.2 on forward-looking expectations in the
Phillips curve. The presence of forward-looking expectations adds an expectation channel
of monetary policy transmission. As a result, the central bank can be less aggressive in
responding to inﬂation deviations from target because private sector expectations take into
account future policy action and move towards the inﬂation target. Figure 2 provides a
comparison of optimal, certainty-equivalent and cautionary rules for this case. Again the
ﬁgure contains nine panels, with each panel corresponding to same combination of point
estimate b and uncertainty vb as in Figure 1. Three ﬁndings are directly apparent. First,
all three policies are less aggressive in their response to lagged inﬂation due to the presence
of an expectations channel for monetary policy. Second, the qualitative properties of the
optimal rule are the same as under the case of adaptive expectations. The optimal extent
of experimentation, that is, the diﬀerence between the cautionary and the optimal rule is
slightly smaller. The intuitive reason is that with γ assumed known to the central bank, a
change in inﬂation expectations has a direct, known eﬀect on inﬂation. Thus, the central
bank does not need to rely as much on the nominal interest rate, whose eﬀect on inﬂation
is imprecise due to uncertainty about β.
Finally, I also add rational learning by private sector agents in ﬁnancial markets,
that is, I incorporate forward-looking expectations of inﬂation in the deﬁnition of the
real interest rate. The policy response to lagged inﬂation under the alternative rules is
reported in Figure 3. Again, the optimal rule exhibits the same qualitative properties
as previously. However, the presence of forward-looking expectations in ﬁnancial markets
further increases the power of the expectations channel of policy transmission. As a result,
the policy rules are less aggressive and the optimal extent of experimentation is reduced.
Policy with uncertain α and β
Next, I consider the learning problem with unknown slope and intercept. This problem
has six state variables. The dynamic programming algorithm described in the appendix
22Figure 3: Optimal vs Cautionary and Certainty Equivalent Policy Rules
Rational learning in labor markets (γ =0 .8) and ﬁnancial markets
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provides numerical approximations for the value and policy functions over a wide range
of the state space. To keep the number of charts in this section manageable I restrict
attention to a comparison of diﬀerent policies for intercept and slope estimates, at−1 =3 .0
and bt−1 = −0.5, respectively. The implied estimate of the natural unemployment rate is
6%.25 Furthermore, the index of persistence will be set equal to 0.8.
As discussed in section 3, even when lagged inﬂation is on target, the variance-
25Results for alternative values of the slope and intercept estimates can be provided upon request.
23Figure 4: Optimal vs Cautionary and Certainty Equivalent Policy Rules
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minimizing setting of the nominal interest rate with two unknown parameters need not
coincide with the neutral setting, which ensures future expected inﬂation to be on target.
In the following I present two sets of results. For the ﬁrst set, displayed in Figure 4, the
covariance vab is chosen exactly so that the variance-minimizing setting of the nominal in-
terest rate coincides with the neutral setting when inﬂation is on target. Thus, the expected
real interest rate and unemployment rate will coincide with their natural levels when lagged
inﬂation equals the target of zero inﬂation. The second set of results, displayed in Figure
245 considers values of the covariance which imply a variance-minimizing level of the interest
rate below the natural level.
Figure 4 also contains nine panels. The ﬁrst row of three panels refers to the case
of adaptive expectations (as in Figure 1), the second row to the case of rational learning
in labor markets, and the third row to the case of rational learning in labor and ﬁnancial
markets. Each column shows the same policy under alternative degrees of uncertainty. The
variance of the slope estimate in each column corresponds to that in the respective columns
of Figures 1, 2 and 3. For illustrative purposes, all panels focus on the policy response when
inﬂation is above target since the response to negative inﬂation deviations is symmetric.
The ﬁrst key result is that the ﬁndings from the learning problem with unknown slope
concerning the optimal policy response to inﬂation carry over to the learning problem
with unknown intercept and slope. The optimal response typically falls inside the wedge
created by the aggressive certainty-equivalent rule and the cautionary rule. Optimal policy
always incorporates a small extent of experimentation but mostly remains gradualist, that
is, less aggressive than a certainty-equivalent rule that disregards parameter uncertainty.
Exceptions to the principle of gradualism only occur near the inﬂation target or under
extreme uncertainty. Even then, these exceptions are small in magnitude. The second
result is that the stronger the expectations channel of monetary policy, the smaller the
required policy response to inﬂation and thus the smaller the diﬀerences between the
optimal, certainty-equivalent and cautionary rules. As discussed above a second source of
gradualism may arise from the covariance of intercept and slope. This eﬀect is illustrated
by Figure 5. The three panels in this ﬁgure correspond to the ﬁrst column of panels in
Figure 4. The only diﬀerence is the value of the covariance vab. I ti sn o ws e ts ot h a t
the variance-minimizing level of the interest rate lies below its natural rate even when
lagged inﬂation is on target. This occurs whenever the policy stance has been on average
below the natural rate for the sample with which the parameters have been estimated.
As a result, the cautionary rule implies a substantially easier policy stance than the
certainty-equivalent rule, that is unaﬀected by the parameter covariance. However, this
25Figure 5: Optimal vs Cautionary and Certainty Equivalent Policy Rules
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covariance eﬀect is substantially reduced under the optimal rule indicating again a degree
of experimentation.
Policy with uncertain β and γ
One key result emerging from the preceding comparisons is that rational learning by
private sector agents tends to reduce the wedge between the certainty-equivalent and cau-
tionary rules and consequently also the optimal extent of gradualism (i.e. the diﬀerence
between the certainty-equivalent and optimal rules) and of experimentation (i.e. the dif-
ference between optimal and cautionary rules). To some degree this ﬁnding may depend
on the fact that the parameter γ which determines the impact of inﬂation expectations on
inﬂation and governs the strength of this expectations channel of monetary transmission
has so far been treated as known with certainty.
Figure 6 shows the alternative policies when both β and γ are uncertain. Again, there
are 9 panels showing the policy response to inﬂation deviations from target under the three
rules. Parameter estimates are bt−1 = −0.5a n dct−1 =0 .8 respectively. The three columns
reﬂect the same values of the variance of the slope considered before, vb =( 0 .04,0.09,0.25),
while the rows now refer to alternative values of vc =( 0 .16,0.36,0.64). The covariances
26Figure 6: Optimal vs Cautionary and Certainty Equivalent Policy Rules
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range from −0.012 to −0.04. The results shown are obtained for the model speciﬁcation
with rational learning in labor markets.
As can be seen from all panels the qualitative ﬁndings of the one-unknown param-
eter case, also survive in this context. Quantitatively, there is still a noticeable extent
of experimentation, but the optimal rule remains almost always less aggressive than the
certainty-equivalent rule, except under very high uncertainty near the inﬂation target.
276 Empirical Examples
The question remains to what extent the diﬀerences between optimal, cautionary and
certainty-equivalent policy rules discussed in the preceding section are of quantitative im-
portance given the degree of uncertainty reﬂected in empirical estimates of the Phillips
curve. Estimating the complete model with rational learning goes beyond the objective of
this paper. Instead, I relate the numerical analysis conducted here to some of the empirical
estimates available in the literature.
The standard framework for estimating the inﬂation-unemployment relationship takes
the following linear form:
πt = a +
I  
i=1
biut−i +
J  
j=1
cjπt−j + dzt +  t (29)
This regression equation usually includes several lags of the inﬂation rate and the unem-
ployment rate and a vector zt that contains proxy variables for supply shocks and various
dummy variables. An estimate of a constant natural rate u∗
t = u∗ ∀t, can be obtained from
the ratio of the estimated regression constant and the sum of the coeﬃcients on current and
lagged unemployment rates, ˆ u∗ = a(
 I
i=1 bi)−1.26 Thus, the degree of uncertainty regarding
NAIRU estimates discussed in the literature is directly related to the precision of estimates
of the slope of the Phillips curve. As shown in preceding section, this type of uncertainty
is more important to monetary policy decisions than the component of NAIRU uncertainty
that derives from the variance of the intercept a in the above regression equation.
I consider estimates from two contributions to the ongoing debate on Phillips curves and
NAIRU uncertainty in the United States (cf. Fuhrer (1995) and Staiger, Stock and Watson
(2002)). Both papers report estimates of a version of the above regression equation (29)
26An approximate measure of the variance of the estimated NAIRU can be calculated by the delta method,
which involves taking a ﬁrst-order Taylor series approximation to the nonlinear function and computing the
variance of this approximation. However,the ratio of the intercept and the sum of slope coeﬃcients has a
doubly non-central Cauchy distribution with dependent numerator and denominator for which means and
variances do not exist. Such a distribution may be skewed and heavy-tailed. Staiger et al. (1997b) point out
that when the slope is estimated imprecisely, normality as implied by the delta method can provide a poor
approximation to the distribution of this ratio. They provide an alternative method to calculate conﬁdence
intervals which are exact under the assumption of exogenous regressor and normal errors.
28Table 2: Phillips Curve Estimates
a
 
b
 
c
Fuhrer (1995)
Estimates 1.68 -0.28 1.0
Variance 0.58 0.015
Covariance: vab -0.09
Staiger et al. (2002)
Estimates -0.28 1.0
Standard Errors 0.01
with a constraint that the coeﬃcients on lagged inﬂation rates sum to one. This corresponds
to γ = 1 in the model of this paper, and thus to the Phillips curve without forward-looking
component. The estimates I consider are summarized in Table 2. The ﬁrst set of estimates
is taken from Fuhrer (1995), page 47, Table 1a.27 The intercept estimate, its variance and
its covariance with the sum of slope coeﬃcients reported here have been computed using
the complete regression results that I received from the author. As to Staiger et al. (2002),
I only use the slope estimate and its variance from the ﬁrst column of Table 1.2 on page
18.28
Table 3 reports the optimal extent of gradualism (the diﬀerence between the optimal
and certainty-equivalent rule) and of experimentation (the diﬀerence between optimal and
cautionary rule) given the empirically estimated degree of uncertainty. The two columns
refer to inﬂation deviations from target of 2% and 3% respectively. The values reported in
the table concern the diﬀerences in the expected unemployment rates that result from the
alternative policy rules.
In both cases I restrict attention to the optimal policy under adaptive expectations in the
Phillips curves, which ﬁts the speciﬁcations chosen by those authors. This also implies that
27These estimates were obtained using quarterly data on the CPI excluding food and energy and the
civilian unemployment rate from 1960:2Q to 1993:4Q. The author uses 12 lags of inﬂation and 2 lags of the
unemployment rate as well as the oil price as supply shock proxy.
28This regression uses the GDP Deﬂator as measure of prices and the civilian unemployment rate. It
diﬀers importantly from Fuhrer’s speciﬁcation in that the intercept and thus the NAIRU is time-varying.
29Table 3: Gradualism and Experimentation
Diﬀerences in Expected Unemployment Rates
πt−1 − π∗ =2 πt−1 − π∗ =3
Fuhrer (1995)
CEQ-OPT 0.51 0.99
OPT-CAU 0.62 0.72
Staiger et al. (2002)
CEQ-OPT 0.32 0.67
OPT-CAU 0.35 0.33
the unemployment diﬀerences reported above are independent of the Okun’s law parameter
λ and the interest rate sensitivity of aggregate demand φ. For Fuhrer’s estimates I consider
the optimal learning problem with unknown intercept and slope and take into account
the covariance eﬀect. For Staiger et al.’s estimates I consider the optimal learning problem
with unknown slope. The optimal policy always lies in between the certainty-equivalent and
cautionary rules. Thus, the certainty-equivalent rule is too aggressive in ﬁghting inﬂation
while the cautionary rule implies too much gradualism. The diﬀerences between the optimal
policy and these alternatives are economically signiﬁcant, ranging from one half to a full
percentage point of the unemployment rate.
7 Conclusions and extensions
The bottomline of the preceding analysis is that an inﬂation-targeting central bank should
not disregard uncertainty about the relationship between unemployment and inﬂation. Typ-
ically, it will be optimal to respond more gradually to inﬂationary shocks than a central
bank that disregards such uncertainty. However, gradualism can be overdone. In particular,
a central bank that implements Brainard’s recommendation of gradualist policymaking in
a myopic manner and disregards dynamic learning eﬀects will respond too cautiously to
inﬂationary shocks. A central bank that recognizes the tradeoﬀ between current control
and experimentation for the sake of reducing uncertainty and improving future policy per-
30formance will be a more aggressive inﬂation ﬁghter than the central bank that implements
Brainard’s recommendation myopically. However, this central bank will still act more grad-
ually than one that disregards parameter uncertainty. Exceptions to this rule arise only
when uncertainty is very high and at the same time inﬂation close to target.
The preceding analysis can be extended along several dimensions. Some of these
extensions are straightforward while others are interesting avenues for future research. The
remainder of this section discusses four such extensions.
Flexible inﬂation targeting
So far, the paper studied policy rules for a strictly inﬂation targeting central bank that
focuses exclusively on inﬂation. However, the framework developed in this paper carries over
to ﬂexible inﬂation targeting with a loss function that includes deviations of unemployment
from its natural rate:
L(πt)=Et−1
 
(πt − π∗)2 + ω(ut − u∗
t)2)
 
(30)
As is well known, the unemployment stabilization objective introduces an alternative motive
for the central bank to respond gradually to inﬂationary shocks. This is directly apparent
from a comparison of the optimal interest rate rules under certainty for strict inﬂation
targeting, equation (11), and the one for ﬂexible inﬂation targeting:
it == −((βλφ)2 + ωγ2)−1
 
(βλφγ − ωγ2)πt−1 − (βλφ− ωγ)βu∗
t−1
 
(31)
A central bank that assigns a positive weight ω to unemployment deviations will respond
less aggressively to inﬂation deviations from target. As a result, inﬂation will be expected
to return more gradually to the target subsequent a shock. Policy rules under uncertainty
can be computed in the same manner as for strict inﬂation targeting. However, due to the
non-normal distribution of u∗ one needs to resort to numerical methods even in the case
of the cautionary rule that is optimal in the static version of the model without learning.
The qualitative properties of the optimal rule under strict inﬂation targeting will survive
31under ﬂexible inﬂation targeting, but of course, quantitative results will diﬀer.
Optimal policy under discretion
Having considered policy choices for a central bank that is able to commit to a speciﬁc
rule, it is of interest to explore optimal policy under discretion. Under discretion, the central
bank will optimize policy taking private sector expectations as given. The private sector will
try to minimize expectational errors taking the central bank’s response to private sector
expectations as given. The main purpose of Clarke et al. (1999) is to compare optimal
policy under discretion and commitment. However, they assume that the parameters of the
economy are known with certainty. The optimal policy under discretion may be derived
as follows. First, one determines the interest rate that minimizes the central bank’s loss
function (1) treating the private sector agents expectation of the interest rate, ie
t, and thus
their inﬂation expectation πe as constant and independent of monetary policy. With known
parameters this corresponds to:
it = −(βλφ)−1(γπt−1 +( 1− γβλφ)πe
t − βu∗
t−1 − π∗) (32)
Private sector agents set ie
t and thus πe
t to minimize forecasts errors taking the central
bank’s response as given. The rational expectation of inﬂation taking (32) as given
corresponds to the inﬂation target π∗. The nominal interest rate in this Nash equilibrium is
equivalent to the interest rate rule under commitment derived in (11). Diﬀerences between
optimal policy under discretion and commitment arise once a policy tradeoﬀ is introduced,
such as the tradeoﬀ between inﬂation and unemployment in the case of ﬂexible inﬂation
targeting under certainty, or the tradeoﬀ between the expected inﬂation deviation from
target and its conditional variance under parameter uncertainty as in section 3 of this
paper. The cautionary policy under discretion can be derived analytically following the
procedure suggested here. The computation of the optimal policy under discretion in the
dynamic model with learning poses an additional complication of the numerical analysis
32that would be an interesting problem to address in future research.29
Demand uncertainty
While studying the implications of uncertainty about the relationship between unem-
ployment and inﬂation in much detail, the other key relationships of the model have been
treated as certain in the preceding analysis. An extension of the model would allow for un-
certainty due to random shocks ( u
t , 
y
t) and imprecisely estimated parameters in the Okun’s
law and aggregate demand relationships such as
ut = φyt +  u
t (33)
yt = λ(it − πe
t)+ 
y
t (34)
with beliefs regarding φ and λ characterized by normal distributions N(p,vp)a n dN(l,vl).
The presence of the random shocks  u
t and  
y
t renders estimation of φ and λ nontrivial.
The resulting imprecision of the parameter estimates will further increase the component
of inﬂation uncertainty that is inﬂuenced by monetary policy. Thus, it will enhance the
motive for caution and widen the wedge between certainty-equivalent and cautionary policy
rules. Increased parameter uncertainty will also tend to strengthen the incentive for ex-
perimentation and consequently the diﬀerence between optimal and cautionary rules. The
demand-side shocks, however, imply some random variation in output and unemployment
that will improve the estimates of the parameters of the inﬂation equation and will tend to
reduce the incentive for experimentation. It is possible to derive the cautionary policy rule
for the case when the Phillips curve parameters as well as φ and λ are imprecisely estimated,
but the curse of dimensionality prevents the numerical analysis of optimal learning treating
all these parameters as jointly unknown. Nevertheless, the techniques presented in this
paper can be used to derive optimal policy rules under uncertainty about φ and λ separately.
Asymmetric information and heterogenous beliefs
29Such an analysis would be related to the theoretical framework developed by Nyarko (1998).
33A key assumption maintained throughout this paper is that rational forward-looking
agents and the central bank have the same information set available when making deci-
sions. As result of this assumption, agents and central bank update their beliefs regarding
the parameters of the inﬂation equation (α,β,γ) in the same manner. In practice, it is rea-
sonable to assume that the central bank has an informational advantage compared to the
public. This is more likely with regard to current estimates of the state of the economy and
short-horizon forecasts than with regard to fundamental issues concerning the structure of
the economy. Heterogenous beliefs about the parameters of the economy are more likely to
arise to diﬀerences between agents and central banks in terms of their priors on reasonable
parameter values or their view regarding the appropriate structural model.
It is straightforward to introduce an informational advantage of the central bank in terms
of an advance signal et about the inﬂation shock  t into the model of this paper. The optimal
policy rule will then include a policy response to this signal quite similar in qualitative terms
to the policy response to lagged inﬂation. The private sector’s rational expectation of this
component of the interest rate rule will be equal zero. Thus, private sector agents will only
be able to predict the component of the policy rule that responds to lagged inﬂation. Since
the signal et does not help in estimating the Phillips curve parameters, belief updating
equations will remain the same for the central bank and the private sector.
The possibility of heterogenous beliefs due to diﬀerences in priors or in the reference
model represents a particularly interesting area for future research. One diﬃculty in this
regard is that one will need to keep track of the central bank’s and private agents’ beliefs
separately. This will substantially increase the state space of the optimal learning problem.
Nevertheless, it should be feasible to study a problem with one unknown parameter and
two sets of alternative beliefs using the techniques developed in this paper.
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Appendix A: The Numerical Dynamic Programming Algorithm
The algorithm used in this paper computes the value function and stationary optimal
policy by iterating over the Bellman equation, which deﬁnes the following contraction map-
ping:
TW =
Min
i
 
L(π,i,θ)+δ
 
W(π ,i,θ )f(π |π,i,θ)dπ 
 
(35)
where T stands for the functional operator and π and θ are last period’s values of the
inﬂation rate and the beliefs about the unknown parameters, that is the state variables
of the problem. W(.) is a continuous function deﬁned on the state space. L(.)d e n o t e s
the expected current loss. The control variable i corresponds to the central bank’s policy
instrument. π  is the inﬂation rate to be realized subsequent the policy action and θ  refers to
the beliefs at the end of the period based on new inﬂation and unemployment observations.
The relevant updating equations for these state variables are (13) and (25). Inﬂations
expectations are solved out according to (18) and expressed in terms of the state variables.
f(π |π,,θ) is the predictive distribution of the inﬂation rate. It is a normal distribution,
because both the error terms and the beliefs are normal distributions.
Successive application of the operator T will generate a sequence of functions Wn that
will converge to the value function V ,i fT is a contraction mapping. Note that the space of
continuous bounded functions is a complete and separable metric space in the sup metric
deﬁned:
ρ(Wn,W n+1)=
Sup
(θ,π)
|Wn(θ,π) − Wn+1(θ,π)| (36)
Standard arguments can be used to show that Blackwell’s suﬃciency conditions are satisﬁed
and T is a contraction mapping in the space of continuous and bounded functions (see for
example Kiefer and Nyarko (1989)) such that:
ρ(TWn+1,TW n) ≤ δρ(Wn+1,W n) (37)
Thus, T has a unique ﬁxed point V , which is the value function and a stationary optimal
policy H(π,θ) exists. This optimal policy corresponds to the set of u’s which minimize the
right-hand side of (35) based on the current state (π,θ).
38V can be computed by value iteration, meaning successive application of the operator T,
since TnW → V uniformly for any continuous bounded function W. A convenient starting
value W0 is the single period loss function L(.) or alternatively a constant. If Wn+1 = TWn,
then ρ(Wn+1,W n) ≤ (Wn,W n−1) and after iterating ρ(Wn+1+i,W n+i) ≤ δ1+iρ(Wn,W n−1).
This implies an upper bound on the error in approximating V by Wn:
ρ(V,Wn) ≤
 
ρ(Wn+1+i,Wn+i) ≤
δ
1 − δ
ρ(Wn,Wn−1) (38)
This upper bound can easily be calculated since it only depends on the discount factor and
the distance between the approximations obtained from the last and the preceding iteration.
The time needed for convergence within a maximal error bound can be reduced signiﬁcantly
by introducing policy iterations in between every value iteration. A policy iteration implies
the application of the following operator:
TPWn = L(π,Hn(π,θ),θ)+δ
 
W(π ,H n(π,θ),θ )f(π |π,Hn(π,θ),θ)dπ  (39)
where Hn(π,θ) is the approximation of the policy function obtained from the preceding
value iteration n.
The computational algorithm then proceeds as follows: ﬁrst, compute starting values
W0 for a grid of points in the state space (π,θ) and save them in a table; secondly, calculate
W1 by applying the operator T to W0 and update said table. This second step requires
calculating the minimum in u for each of the grid values of the state variables (π,θ). For
this purpose next period’s expected value is calculated by evaluating the following integral:
 
W0(π ,u,θ )f(π |π,i,θ)dπ  (40)
The functions W(.) and the updating equations to obtain π  and θ  are known functions
and the conditional density of π  is normal. Thus the integral can be calculated using
Gaussian quadrature and values of W0 from the table, where W(.) is evaluated in between
grid points by linear interpolation.
Given an approximation for this integral the minimization problem on the right-hand
side of the functional equation can be solved by standard numerical optimization proce-
dures. However the search for the minimum turns out to be diﬃcult because there may
exist multiple local minima. As a consequence there may be kinks in the value function
and discontinuities in the optimal policy. Therefore I use a slow but secure optimization
procedure such as golden section search supplemented by a rough initial grid search.
For each value of (θ,π), the minimum in u gives the value of W1() used to update the
table. The maximum of |W1(θ,π) − W0(θ,π)| is used to calculate the upper bound of
the approximation error. Finally, the whole procedure is repeated to obtain W2 and so
on until the diﬀerence between two successive approximations is suﬃciently small (< 0.5%).
Computation Costs
The numerical dynamic programming problems dealt with in this paper require substan-
tial computational eﬀort largely because of the so-called curse of dimensionality. The largest
problem considered had six state variables. If each of the six state variables is approximated
with a grid of N gridpoints, the integration and optimization procedures described above
have to be carried out N6 times to complete one value iteration. The optimization step is
especially time-consuming because of the existence of multiple local optima.
Several steps have been taken to reduce computation time: (i) the introduction of policy
iterations, which reduce the number of value iterations needed for convergence, and thus
39the number of times that the optimization procedure has to be executed; (ii) a convenient
reformulation of the problem allows the reduction of the state space by one state variable,
which means that the integration and optimization steps only have to be carried out N5
times per value iteration;30 (iii) the algorithm is written in FORTRAN so ad to reduce
computation time relative to higher-level languages such as MATLAB.
The most time-consuming problems computed in this paper are those with two
unknown parameters. The largest grid used in this case consisted of 13 ∗ 15 ∗ 19 ∗ 16 ∗ 29
gridpoints. In this case, I also used 60-point Gaussian quadrature with respect to the
shock  . Convergence as deﬁned by a 0.5% maximal diﬀerence between the two ﬁnal value
function approximations for these problems was achieved after about 60 hours on a 2.4.
GHz Intel Pentium 4 Chip with 1 MB RAM. Typically convergence required 6 to 8 value
iterations with a declining number of policy iterations (50 or less) in between every value
iteration.
Appendix B: Convergence of Beliefs and Policies
Although the paper so far discussed in detail optimal policies with dynamic learning, it
avoided the question whether the central bank and private agents will eventually learn the
true parameter values as more and more data becomes available. This question has been the
focus of a theoretical literature on optimal learning in a controlled regression framework (eg.
Easley and Kiefer (1988) and Kiefer and Nyarko (1989)). The learning problem considered
here diﬀers from the regression framework studied in that literature in several ways: (i) the
intercept may be time-varying, (ii) the regression includes a lagged dependent variable, and
(iii) the regression includes an expectation of the dependent variable.
In a framework where the natural unemployment rate is time-varying, the need for
learning and adjusting policy in response to changes in parameter estimates persists through
time. A policymaker who considers that the NAIRU may change, will always attach a
positive variance to her beliefs about the unknown intercept and adjust policy accordingly.
Uncertainty about the intercept is renewed in every period and the policymaker will never
learn the true natural rate because it will keep changing.
In the case of a constant natural rate, one can bring some of the convergence results
obtained by Kiefer and Nyarko (1989) (KN) to bear on this problem. In the following I
discuss convergence for the formulation with adaptive expectations of the private sector
πe
t = πt−1 but the argument can be generalized to the case with rational learning on the
part of private agents. Under adaptive expectations the coeﬃcient on lagged inﬂation in
the Phillips curve corresponds to 1, and α and β can be estimated by means of this simple
regression
∆πt = α − βut +  t (41)
with the change rather than the level of inﬂation as dependent variable.
The parameter estimates and covariance matrix are updated according to an appropri-
ately simpliﬁed version of (25). This corresponds to Bayesian updating of bivariate normal
beliefs. KN provide a general convergence result that applies to this class of regression
equations. They show that under general assumptions concerning the form of beliefs and
the shock process, the process of posterior beliefs always converges with probability 1 (The-
orem 4.1., p. 577). However, the limiting belief may or may not be centered on the true
values. The proof of this theorem relies on an application of the martingale convergence
theorem. It is straightforward to conﬁrm that the point estimates at and bt in (25) follow a
martingale relative to the decisionmaker’s information. Since Et−1[∆πt−at−1+bt−1ut]=0 ,
30For a discussion of this reformulation see the appendix of Wieland (2000a).
4031 it follows that Et−1[at]=at−1 and Et−1[bt]=bt−1.
Whether the process of posterior beliefs converges to the truth or not, depends on the
behavior of the series of unemployment rates ut. KN provide two results that hold for simple
regressions. First, if ut does not converge, then the process of posterior beliefs converges
to the point mass on the true parameter values (Theorem 4.2., p. 577). Second, if ut does
converge to a limit value, then the posterior beliefs may converge to a limit belief that does
not coincide with the true parameter values. This introduces the possibility of incomplete
learning. At a minimum however the decision maker learns the mean of the dependent
variable that corresponds to the limiting value of ut (Theorem 4.3., p. 578). KN then
characterize the set of possible (including incorrect) limit beliefs and policies. However,
without solving for the optimal policy, KN cannot determine the frequency with which
incomplete learning may occur. This question has been addressed in Wieland (2000a) and
(2000b). 32
With a constant natural rate the model considered in this paper generates complete
learning of the unknown parameters under all of the three policy feedback rules. Because
the accelerationist Phillips curve contains a unit root, any policy that attempts to perma-
nently lower (raise) the unemployment rate below (above) the natural rate, would imply
that the rate of inﬂation goes towards +(-) inﬁnity. Furthermore, a policy that stabilizes
unemployment exactly at its natural rate, would render the inﬂation process a random walk.
Inﬂation only remains under control if the policymaker pursues an active stabilization policy
that responds to past values of the inﬂation rate. Using this property of the model, one can
appeal to theorems 4.1. and 4.2. in KN to prove that complete learning will occur. First,
theorem 4.1. implies that the process of posterior beliefs (at,b t,Σt) about the unknown
parameters α and β in (41) converges with probability one to a limit belief (a∞,b ∞,Σ∞)
as t →∞ . For any given belief, the unemployment rate that obtains under the cautionary
policy, is a function of the means, the variance of the slope, the covariance, and the pre-
ceding period’s inﬂation rate. For example, in any time period t the unemployment rate
associated with a given belief (a∞,b ∞,Σ∞) would be:
ut =
a∞
b∞
+
b∞
b2
∞ + vb
∞
(α + βut−1 +  t−1 − π∗)+
(vab
∞ − vb
∞
a∞
b∞)
(b2
∞ + vb
∞)
(42)
Because policy responds to the preceding period’s inﬂation rate, the unemployment rate
eﬀectively is a function of the preceding period’s price shock  t−1.I ne a c ht i m ep e r i o d ,a
new   shock is realized. Thus, even if the policymaker’s beliefs were to remain constant, the
unemployment rate would keep changing over time. Consequently, ut does not converge;
and, according to theorem 4.2 in KN, the process of posterior beliefs converges to the point
mass on the true parameter values, (at,b t,va
t ,vb
t,vab
t ) → (α,β,0,0,0) with probability 1 as
t →∞ .
To build further intuition concerning the asymptotic properties of beliefs and policies
it is useful to consider the relationship between posterior beliefs and the sequence of un-
employment rates more directly. The elements of the covariance matrix are related to the
31This is true because ut is a deterministic function of it and eﬀectively part of the central bank’s infor-
mation set at t-1.
32Wieland (2000a) using numerical methods has characterized the value function and optimal policy for
controlling a simple regression with two unknown parameters as in KN. Optimal experimentation was found
to be most pronounced in the neighborhood of potentially self-reinforcing incorrect beliefs. Wieland (2000b)
has shown that a myopic, passive-learning policy in a model with unknown money demand may frequently
be uninformative and induce a long-lasting bias in the setting of the policy instrument that would not emerge
under the optimal policy.
41sequence {ui}t
i=0 as follows:
vb
t =
σ2
 
t  
i=0
(ui − ¯ ut)2
vab
t =¯ utvb
t (43)
va
t =
σ2
 
t
+¯ u2
tvb
t
where ¯ ut is the sample average. Clearly, whether the covariance matrix converges to the
zero matrix as t →∞ , will depend on the behavior of the sum of squared deviations of
unemployment from its sample mean
 t
i=0(ui−¯ ut)2. This is a non-decreasing series and as t
increases it may either go towards inﬁnity or towards a positive number K. If unemployment
varies suﬃciently so that
 t
i=0(ui − ¯ ut)2 →∞as t →∞ , then Σt → 0. Then also the
point estimates (at,b t) → (α,β) as a consequence of the martingale convergence theorem.
Alternatively, if the sequence of unemployment rates ut were to settle down to a ﬁxed value
fairly soon,
 t
i=0(ui− ¯ ut)2 → K, then the deviation between ut and its sample mean would
go towards zero and uncertainty about the parameter estimates would remain even in the
limit. As argued above, this case will not arise here, because under the hypothesis of an
accelerationist Phillips curve, controlling inﬂation requires an active stabilization policy and
thus continuing variations in unemployment.
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